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IN THE; SUPREME COURT OF THE; STATS OF U1'Ah 
R. MILTON YORGASON, 
Salt Lake County Assessor, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, ex. rel., 
EPISCOPAL MANAGEMENT CORP., 
Defendant and Respondent.) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 18986 
Defendant and respondent Episcopal Managenent Corporation 
(hereinafter "Respondent"), by and through its attorneys, Fabian & 
Clendenin, submit the following Brief in response to the Brief on 
Appeal of plaintiff and appellant. 
STATEMENT OF ThE CASE 
Plaintiff and Appellant (hereinafter "Appellant") caused 
the real property and improvements located at 650 South 3rd East, 
Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County to be assessed and taxed, claiming 
that the property was not eligible for a charitable exemption under 
Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah Constitution. 
LEGAL POSTURE OF THESE PROCEEDINGS 
On November 14, 1980, the Salt Lake County Boara of 
Equalization found the property located at 650 South 3rd East in 
Salt Lake City, known as "St. Mark's Tower," to be exempt from real 
property tax because it was used exclusively for charitable purposes 
within the meaning of Article XIII, Section 2 of the Constitution of 
the State of Utah. Appellant appealed this decision to the Utah 
State Tax Commission, which held a formal hearing on September 25, 
1981. On May 3, 1982 the Tax Commission is;u"d its f1nc11nys of 
fact, conclusions of law unanimously dtfHmln'J the ruliny of the 
Board of Equalization and holding the property to be exempt trom 
taxation under the terms of Article XIII, 2. Appellant 
appealed the Tax Commission's decision to the Third Jua1c1al 
District Court, Tax Division, Salt Lake County. The parties have 
stipulated that the decision of this Court shall be effective for 
tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties have entered into a Stipulation of Facts. 
Included in the Stipulation is an agreement that the transcript of 
the formal hearing before the Tax Commission may be used in the 
disposition of this case. The specific facts reflected in the 
record are those existent at the date of the formal hearing before 
the Tax Commission on September 25, 1981, but mutatis mutanais, 
these facts may be assumed to apply to all three tax years in 
question. 
Appellant's statement of the facts is incomplete for a 
proper understanding of the issues involved and wholly disregards 
the many ways in which St. Mark's Tower provides a benefit to the 
community by meeting important social needs and the contributions 
made to the project by Respondent. Therefore, a brief recitation of 
the facts is in order. 
Episcopal Management Corporation is a Utah non-prof it 
corporation. Its Articles of Incorporation are attached to the 
Stipulation of Facts. The Fifth Article recites in specific detail 
the exclusive charitable purpose of the corporation. 
-2-
It is 
stipulated that the actual use to which St. Mark's Tower is being 
put is consistent ana in conformity with these Articles. (R. 39). 
The corporation has been given tax-exempc status by the Internal 
Revenue Service (tax exempt No. IC 30-82). 
The Bishop of the Episcopal Diocese of Utah is ex officio a 
member of the Board of Directors. The Board, consisting of seven 
members, serves without compensation. It meets monthly to make 
policy decisions. (R. 38). 
The corporation acquired certain real property at 650 South 
3rd East in Salt Lake City (the legal description is Lot 7, Block 
19, Plat A, Salt Lake City Survey) and constructed on it a 10 story 
building known as "St. Mark's Tower." (R. 34). The Tower was 
acquired, constructed and operated through funding from the U.S. 
government under Section 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959 (12 
U.S.C. § l 70lq (R. 36-37). The corporation received a loan 
from the Department of Housing and Urban Development of $3,638,600, 
for construction, secured by a mortgage which made Episcopal 
Management Corporation liable for failure to make the necessary 
payments. (R. 37). 
St. Mark's Tower is managed by Danville Development 
Corporation, a corporation organized for profit, which receives 7% 
of the gross rents collected. This arrangement is mandated by HUD 
regulations, which require that non-profit corporations financed 
under § 202 of the National Housing Act of 1959 (12 U.S.C. § 170lq 
enter into management contracts. Episcopal Management 
Corporation's contract with Danville has been approved by HUD. The 
director of St. Mark's Tower, Ms. Vicki P. Cotterell, has 
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certification in gerontology and halos u l<. A. 'J""'j rc:.o in psycholog 1 
from Kansas State University. (R. 36). She organizes social 
programs for the tenants. (k. 38). 
The Tower consists of 98 rental units together with a 
commons room where the social services and recreation activities 
offered, a resident manager's apartment, and several offices useo bf 
the administration. (R. 36). There are no commercial businesses 
(such as a restaurant or physician's office) in the building. 
(R. 36). 
To be eligible to reside in the Towers, a tenant must be 
over 62 years of age or handicapped. No more than 10% of the 
tenants may be handicapped. (R. 37). As of January, 1981, no 
tenant may have income in excess of $12,000 per year, if single, or 
$13,700 per year for a married couple. There is no discrimination 
or preference based on religion, race or sex. (R. 37). There are 
at present 102 tenants. The average annual income ot residents is 
$4,600. The highest income is $9,500 and the lowest is $1,900. 
(Tr. 13 and last page of Exhibit 3 attachea thereto). Inue!Jendent 
verification of income figures is made. (Tr. 15). 
The rent for each unit is established by HUD on the basis 
of fair market value for equivalent private facilities in the 
community. As of January, 1981, the rent is $433/month per unit. 
The tenant pays 25% of his adjusted gross annual income toward 
rent. The average monthly rent paid by the tenants is $96 per 
month. (R. 37). The difference between the rent paid by the tenant 
and the established fair market rent is paid by HUD. The mortgage 
indebtedness is paid from the proceeds of the tenants' rental 
-4-
payments and HUD subsidies, as are the operating expenses. Any 
excess must be to reouce the mortgage. (k. 38). 
The Episcopal Management Corporation has made, and is 
continuing to make, substantial contributions toward the complex, in 
addition to agreeing to become personally liable on the mortgage (as 
discussed earlier and set forth at R. 37). The corporation's Board 
of Directors, consisting of seven members, as one of its functions, 
meets once each month to make policy decisions with regard to the 
operation of St. Mark's Tower. All Board Members are volunteers and 
serve without compensation. (R. 38). Approximately 1,250 man hours 
were spent by volunteers on behalf of the Episcopal Diocese of Utah 
-- the parent of Episcopal Management Corporation -- in negotiations 
with HUD that led to the financing agreement between HUD and 
Episcopal Management Corporation, the selection of the building 
site, the construction of St. Mark's Tower, and the selection of the 
managing agent. None of the volunteers were compensated for their 
time. In addition, approximately $1,500 was incurred in travel 
expenses, all paid for by the Episcopal Diocese of Utah, and not 
reimbursed by the Episcopal Management Corporation. (R. 39). 
The record also makes clear that St. Mark's Tower provides 
a great benefit to he community by serving a great social need. The 
undisputed testimony is that the project saves the State government 
much more than the roughly $40,000 a year that Salt Lake County 
would gain in revenues from a tax assessraent on the proprty. (Tr. 
39-40' 72). Moreover, there are an insufficient number of 
County-owned facilities for the type of people served by St. Mark's 
Tower. It is estimated that there are 26,000 people in Salt Lake 
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County who meet HUD guidelines for nousing need, 1et there are less 
than a thousand county units availaole tor these µeople. ( 'l'r. b 71 
The public housing authorities view oµerations such as St. Mark's 
Tower as a most valuable complement to their program and a benefit 
to governmental activity in this area. (Tr. 76-68). 
Housing operations for the elderly and handicapped are very 
limited. They may go to buildings that provide single room 
occupancy ("SRO"). The possible horror of such an option is 
described by Ms. Cotterell. (Tr. 17-19). They may go to rest 
homes, where it is undisputed that the cost is substantially greater 
than the cost per resident at places such as St. Mark's Tower. 
(R. 38; Tr. 39-40, 72). It is ironic that an estimated 20% of those 
in more expensive rest homes are there, not because they need rest 
home care, but because they have no place else to go. (Tr. 50). 
They may go live with their children, although experience shows that 
this often leads to severe emotional problems and strains family 
relations. (Tr. 32). Or they may go to a community such as that 
which exists at St. Mark's Tower. All of the witnesses called, who 
are experts in this field, agreed that this latter alternative was 
by far the most desirable and by far the cheapest alternative for 
society. The physhic and other advantages of the St. Mark's Tower 
experience extend the time before more expenseive 
institutionalization is required. (Tr. 51-53). 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT'S USE OF THE PROPERTY MEETS THE "CHARITABLE PUkPOSE" 
TEST ESTABLISHED BY THIS COURT IN FRIENDSHIP MANOk. 
Appellant relies upon Friendship Manor Corp. v. Tax 
Commission, 487 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1971) to justify taxation of st. 
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Mark's Tower. Respondent submits that such reliance is totally 
misplaced, and that the factors which were found to be significant 
in finding non-exemption in Friendship Manor are the very ones which 
are not present in the case of St. Mark's Tower. 
Friendship Manor involved an apartment building of 228 
units. Tenants in the Manor had to meet certain requirements. 
Eighty percent of them had to be over 62 years olJ. They must be 
ambulatory. They must be financially able to pay the rent 
established and the Manor did not accept tenants if they were not 
financially able to maintain or pay the expenses and maintain the 
standard of living which was required. Rents were established so 
that the total amount collected met all expenses plus amortization 
of interest and principal on the mortgage. Certain commercial 
businesses were also allowed to· operate in the building. The Utah 
Supreme Court ruled that under these facts, the Manor should not be 
exempt from taxation: 
Where the senior citizen is paying for all of the 
services he receives and the rental of the apartments is not 
determined by need, but is determined by what is required to 
retire the principal and interest of the mortgage, together with 
all upkeep and operation expenses, no charitable purpose is 
involved. The state does not have the obligation to provide 
living accommodations to persons well able and willing to pay 
for their needs. 
487 P.2d at 1280. 
In so holding, this Court established a test for 
determining what is a charitable use. If rental payments are 
insufficient to cover the cost of the complex, and are adJusted to 
reflect each tenant's ability to pay, then a charitable exemption is 
available; otherwise, it is not. In the case of St. Mark's Tower, 
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the resident does not pay the full cost of all tl,e services he 
receives and the rental paid by each resident is aeterm1nea oy nee, 1 
(i.e. 25% of his total income). 
Respondent does not quarrel with the result in Friendship 
Manor. It establishes sound public policy. Indeed, the very 
differences between the operation of St. Mark's Tower and 
Manor are the very differences this Court has looked to in 
determining what is a charitable use under the "Friendship Manor 
test". 
Appellant argues that St. Mark's Tower fails the Friendsh1e 
Manor test, since the "rental actually due" is not based on each 
tenant's ability to pay. This contention misstates the facts of 
this case, as the tenants are not required, expected or encouraged 
to pay anything above 25% of their income for rental. Since 
Friendship Manor looks solely to whether the tenant is paying a 
rental based on his ability to pay, the Friendship Manor test is 
satisfied here. 
Appellant also relies on Beerman Foundation, lnc. v. Board 
of Tax Appeals, 87 N.E. 2d 474 (Ohio 1949), which states that if tne 
tenants of a housing complex are required to pay any rental, the 
complex's property is not used for charitable purposes. Beerman, 
however, reflects the minority view; the prevailing view, which has 
become almost universally accepted in more recent cases, is that tt1e 
charitable use is not destroyed if the tenants do pay some rent, 
especially if the amount is adjusted to reflect their ability to pay 
and is below the market rate -- as is the case here. see, 
Fredericka Home v. San Diego County, 221 P.2d 68 (Cal. 1950); 71 
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Am.Jur.2d State and Loci.ll Taxation,§ 373 (1973). Utah adopted the 
maJor1ty view in Friendship Manor, which hela that a charitable 
exemption can be available even if tenants are required to pay rent, 
so long as the rent charged each tenant is adjusted to reflect his 
or her ability to pay. Friendship Manor, 487 P.2d at 1280. See 
also Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission ex rel. Laborers Local No. 
205, 658 P.2d 1192, 1198-9 (Utah 1983) (Oaks, Chief Justice, 
concurring). 
II. HOUSING FOR ELDERLY AND HANDICAPPED PEOPLE CAN BE A CHARITABLE 
PURPOSE IF THE FRIENDSHIP MANOR TEST IS SATISFIED. 
Appellant also argues that the housing of senior citizens 
and the handicapped can never constitute a charitable use of 
property. Among the cases cited by appellant for this proposition 
is United Presbyterian Association v. Board of County Commissioners, 
448 P.2d 967 (Colo. 1975), where the court stated that "the 
furnishing of homes to older adults is not in itself a charitable 
purpose." Id. at 975. But the court did not hold that such a use 
could never be charitable; rather, it held that under the facts of 
that particular case, there was no charitable use. The court found 
that there was "material reciprocity between alleged recipients and 
their alleged donors." Id. at 976. In other words, there was a 
market-type relationship between the landlord and tenants in which 
the tenants paid market rents which were not adJusted to reflect the 
tenant's ability co pay. 
The United Presbyterian approach is very similar to that of 
Friendship Manor. This is not surprising, as Friendship Manor 
relied heavily on United Presbyterian. Thus, Friendship Manor 
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establishes that under Utah law a housing complex tnr elGerly ana 
handicapped people is a charitable use it till" Fr ll'n'c >11ip i'lanor test 
is satisfied, notwithstanding any contrJry authority tr0m other 
states, including two other cases cited oy Appellant, Paraclete 
Manor of Kansas City v. State Tax Comm1ssior2, 447 S.W.Ld Jll (Mo. 
1969), and Beerman Foundation Inc. v. Board of Tax Appeals, 87 
N.E. 2d 474 (Ohio 1949). 
III. POSSIBLE FUTURE SALE OF PROPERTY DOES NOT AFFECT ITS EXEMPTIUt,. 
Appellant contends that since the Episcopal Diocese of Utan 
-- the parent of respondent -- may be able to sell the St. Mark's 
Tower property at some future date for a substantial consideration, 
the Diocese could benefit from the property, which is therefore not 
being used exclusively for charitable purposes and hence is 
ineligible for a exemption. In support of this argument, 
Appellant cites several cases, all of which are readily 
distinguishable in that they involve the receipt by a non-profit 
corporation of income resulting from continuing activities carried 
out on the property, and not revenues derived by the corporation 
from the sale of the property. 
In Parker v. Quinn, 64 P. 961 (Utah 1901), pai:t of the 
property in question was rented out by the nonprofit corporate 
owner, which applied the rental payments to charitable endeavors; 
this Court held that the charitable exemption was unavailable as to 
that part of the property, since it was not being used exclusively 
for charitable purposes. Ia. at 962. Similarly, in Malad Second 
Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. State '!'dX 
Commission, 269 P.2d 1077 (Idaho 1954), the court held that land 
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owneo by a nonprofit corporation on which wheat was raisea was not 
oeing used exclusively for charitable purposes, even though the 
wheat was distributed to the needy as part of a cnaritable program; 
the court equated the harvesting of the wheat with the receipt of 
income from the property. Id. at 1079. 
Appellant has cited no cases in which the possible future 
sale of property used for charitable purposes, the proceeds of which 
go to the nonprofit corporate seller, was held to disqualify tne 
property from a charitable deauction. To the best of Respondent's 
knowledge, there are no such cases. This is not surprising, for two 
reasons. First, such a doctrine would effectively eliminate the 
charitable exemption from ad valorem property taxation. So long as 
the property has any value, a future sale would always be possible 
and the resulting gain to the potential seller would cause the 
property to lose its exemption. In the unlikely event that the 
property is absolutely worthless, it would not need the exemption in 
order to escape ad valorem taxation, which by definition is levied 
in proportion to the property's value, Callaway v. City of Overland 
Park, 508 P.2d 907 (Kansas 1973). Second -- conceding for the 
moment that respondent's sale of property could at some time affect 
the property exemption -- Appellant's argument runs afoul of the 
rule that a mere prospective use of the property does not affect its 
eligibility for a charitable exemption. This rule is explicitly 
applied to deny an exemption to property designated by its owners 
tor a charitable use which has not materialized as of the date of 
the assessment, see, Society of St. Vincent DePaul, Inc. v. 
Deeartment of Revenue, 537 P. 2d 69 (Oregon 1975), but it is also 
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tacitly recognized to apply to the whole tielci uf chdritable 
property tax exemptions by all courts, who confine their examination 
of the property's uses to its past or present uses, not to 
hypothetical future uses. See. Friendship Manor, supra; Loyal 
Order of Moose No. 259 v. County Board of Equalization of Salt Lake 
County, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982). If Appellant believes that a 
future sale of the property should result in a tax assessment, he 
should raise this issue at the time of the sale, not at the present 
time. 
IV. ST. MARK'S TOWER COMPLIES WITH THE RELEVANT STATUTORY GUIDELINES. 
Utah Code Annotated § 59-2-30 (1974) provides a statutory 
clarification of the constitutional exemption: 
Property Used for Religious Worship or Charitable Purposes -
Requirements for Exemption. This section is intended to clarify 
the scope of exemptions for property used exclusively for either 
religious worship or charitable purposes provided for in section 
2 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the state of Utah. 
This section is not intended to expand or limit the scope of 
such exemptions. Any property whose use is dedicated to 
religious worship or charitable purposes including property 
which is incidental to and reasonably necessary for the 
accomplishment of such religious worship or charitable purposes, 
intended to benefit an indifinite number of persons is exempt 
from taxation if all of the following requirements are met: 
(1) The user is not organized to produce a 
profit from the use of the property. 
(2) No part of any net earnings, from the use ot 
the property, inures to the benefit of any private 
shareholder or individual, but any net earnings shall be 
used directly or indirectly, for the charitable or 
religious purposes of the organization. 
(3) The property is not used or operated by the 
organization or other person so as to benefit any officer, 
trustee, director, shareholder, lessor, member, employee, 
contributor, or any other person through the distribution 
of profits, payment of excessive charges or compensations. 
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(4) Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or 
abandonment of tne user no part of any proceeds derived 
from such use will inure to the benefit of any private 
person. 
The Episcopal Management Corporation in its ownership and 
operation of St. Mark's Tower complies fully with all of the 
requirements of this statute. Thus: 
(1) Episcopal Management Corporation is not organizea 
to produce a profit from the use of the property. 
(2) No part of any net earnings from the use of St. 
Mark's Tower inures to the benefit of any private shareholder, 
individual, but any net earnings are used directly or indirectly 
for the charitable purposes of the Episcopal Management 
Corporation. 
(3) St. Mark's Tower is not used or operated by 
Episcopal Management Corporation or any other person so as to 
benefit any officer, trustee, director, shareholder, lessor, 
member, employee, contributor, or any otiler person through the 
distribution of profits, payment of excessive charges of 
compensations. 
(4) Upon the liquidation, dissolution, or abandonment 
of Episcopal Management Corporation, no part of any proceeds 
derived from such use will inure to the benefit of any private 
person. 
V. AN EXEMPTION SHOULD NOT BE DENIED BECAUSE THE CHARITABLE 
ACTIVITES ARE GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED. 
Appellant further contends that Respondent's use of the 
property is not "charitable" under Article XIII, § 2 of the Utah 
Constitution because Respondent has not contributed anything of 
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value to the complex, as it is being paid for t>y cuncls fron1 the 
Federal Government and from the tenants ut the proJect. This 
"source of funds" argument is tlawed for two reasons. tirst, 
considerations of the source of funding tor charitable proJects are 
not relevant in determining whether an exemption exists. Second, 
the record in this case shows that Respondent has made substantial 
contributions to the complex. 
A. Source of Funds Irrelevant. 
Even if the facts of this case showed that St. Mark's Tower 
is entirely funded by its tenants and by the Federal Government, the 
complex would still be entitled to a charitable exemption. The only 
seemingly contrary Utah authority came in Salt Lake County v. Tax 
Commission ex rel. Laborers Local No. 295, 658 P.2d 1192 (Utah 
1983), a case not even cited by Appellant. In that case, this 
Court, without any discussion of the issue, stated that an 
apprenticeship program conducted by a group of labor unions "cannot 
be classified as charitable because it is entirely funded througn a 
combination of federal grants and tuition paid by apprentices 
themselves, rather than through the union or its members." Id. at 
1194. 
Neither this Court nor the petitioners in that case -- who 
had urged the court to accept this principle -- provided any 
citations for this statement, and the respondent did not even deal 
with the issue in its brief. Moreover, the statement is clearly 
dictum, as the court went on to hold that an exemption was 
inapplicable because the activities conducted on the property 
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including the apprent1cesh1p program -- were "rendered primarily on 
hehalf of union members and their families." Id. The underlying 
basis of tl11s Court's decision was that the primary reason for the 
union's existence was to benefit its own members, a limited, 
self-defined group. Episcopal Management's sole purpose is to 
benefit the elderly, a category into which all people will fall if 
they live long enough. 
The failure of the part of Laborers Local to fully discuss 
the "source of funds" issue is made more remarkable by the fact that 
its statement goes against the established doctrine in Utah that the 
use of the property is exclusively determinative. As this Court 
said in Friendship Manor: 
It is the use to which it puts its real property which is the 
determination of whether or not such property is exempt. 
487 P.2d at 1276 (emphasis supplied). In subsequent exemption 
cases, this Court has looked solely to the use of the property and 
not to the source of funds. See, Eyring Research Institute v. 
Tax Commission, 598 P. 2d 1348 (Utah 1979); Baker v. une Piece ot 
Improved Real Property, 570 P. 2d 1028 (Utah 1977). 
The idea that the existence of a gift can be negated by the 
presence of government funds was rejected by Chief Justice Oaks in 
his concurring opinion in Laborers Local: 
A gift or sacrifice for the welfare of the community can be 
identified . . from a substantial imbalance in the exchanges 
between the charitable organization and recipient (i.e. the 
absence of reciprocity) 
658 P.2d at 1198. The "absence of reciprocity" is the Friendship 
:-lanor use test. Thus, as Chief Justice Oaks recognized, so long as 
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there is a charitable use, a gift "'lem,,11t £'fl:'::."ier1L, relJarcJies.·:; ''l 
the source of funds. 
The lower court in this case alc;o refused to look b"yo11u 
the use to the source of funds in holding tor an exemption: 
. the tenants who are in need of charitable assistance are 
receiving it in this housing. To look to tne source of tunds L, 
try to determine whether or not the activity is "charitable" 
would create untold mischief. What woula you do about the keu 
Cross, Salvation Army, etc.? 
Yorgason v. County Board of Equalization, Civil No. C 82-4002 at p. 
2 (Third Judicial District, December 14, 1982). 
The weight of authority from other states which have 
expressly and fully considered the "source of funds" argument goes 
against Appellant's contention. In Franciscan Tertiary Province v. 
State Tax Commission, 566 S.W.2d 213 (Mo. 1978), the court overruled 
several earlier cases to hold that a housing proJect used for 
charitable purposes does not lose its charitable exemption if the 
funds for the project come solely from the government. Id. at 226. 
While the housing project in Franciscan was supported oy a 
combination of federal funds and contributions from the nonprofit 
corporate owner, the court expressly reaffirmed its earlier 
in Bader Realty & Investment Co. v. St. Louis housing Authority, 217 
S.W.2d 489 (Mo. 1949), which permitted a tax exemption for a housing 
project whose funds came solely from government sources. 
Franciscan, 566 S.W.2d at 226. 
Like the lower court in this case, the Franciscan court 
rejected the "source of funds" argument because it realized that the 
argument could be applied to any charity, such as the ked Cross or 
United Way, that obtains its funding from outside sources. 
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Franciscan also refuseJ to create a special "source of funds" theory 
tor government grants, a government grant has the same 
eftect as a contribution from a private source: 
money to finance these homes for the aged at interest 
well below market rates, or providing for interest or rent 
subsidies, does constitute a subsidy or contribution comparable 
to charitable contributions from indiviauals or corporations. 
They have the same effect. 
566 S.W.2d at 22. 
Franciscan is particularly apposite to this case because it 
involved a housing project almost identical to St. Mark's Tower, and 
because it construed a statute almost identical to Article XIII, § 2 
of the Utah Constitution. The statute there provided for an 
exemption for property "used exclusively . . for purposes purely 
charitable", while the Utah Constitution's exemption is for property 
"used exclusively for charitable purposes." Of the Missouri 
statute, Franciscan said: 
The statute clearly makes the use of the property the focus of 
the exemption . [the] relevance [of other factors] is 
strictly confined to the extent which they may indicate the 
purpose for which the property is used and whether such purpose 
is charitable. 
566 S.W.2d at 223. The court continued: 
Furthermore, we cannot believe that it is the intent of the 
people under [the statute] to withhold the financial assistance 
of a tax exemption until such time as our elderly are totally 
incapable of providing for themselves. The whole thrust of 
[such] projects . . is to assist its tenants in avoiding such 
status by providing an atmosphere where they can remain 
self-sustaining as long as possible. The payment of monthly 
rent at [such) proJects may be for some as important as the 
other valuable activities. Although federal or other assistance 
is obviously being provided, the sense of paying one's own way 
can be an important intangible which reaffirms continued utility 
and dignity. 
)66 S.W.2d at 226. 
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Since Franciscan involveo similar stotutory language ana an 
almost identical housing corn[Jlex, these comments dre elJually 
applicable to the present case and a highly persuasive 
rationale for an exemption here. 
The non-Utah cases cited by Appellant in support of its 
"source of funds" argument are not on point. Lutheran Home, Inc. v. 
Board of County Commissioners, 505 P. 2d 1118 (Kansas 1973), involv€a 
a nursing home where half of the tenants paid their rent out of 
their own funds and the remaining tenants' rental was paid out of 
welfare funds. Id. at 1121. The court noted that the property 
owner expected to be paid -- from whatever source -- the full market 
rental for each tenant. Id. at 1125. In addition, the court notea 
that the nursing home was originally operated as a profit-making 
enterprise which became insolvent and was reorganized into a 
nonprofit corporation, which operated the nursing home in 
essentially the same manner as did its predecessor. The non-profit 
corporation did not even have the word "charity" in its articles of 
incorporation. Id. at 1124-25. The unmistakable conclusion is tnat 
the court decided against an exemption largely to thwart a 
reorganization of a for-profit business into a nonprofit corporation 
for the sole purpose of reducing its tax burden. No such situation 
occurred here; St. Mark's Tower was conceived as, and has always 
operated as, a nonprofit venture. Moreover, Lutheran Horne's use of 
the property was not exclusively charitable -- a requirement for an 
exemption under the Kansas Constitution -- as there were no 
financial need requirements and about half of the tenants were able 
to pay their rent without any governmental assistance. 
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Id. at 
1121. Here, however, all of tne tenants are needy, so the property 
is being used exclusively for the charitable purpose of providing 
housing for low-income individuals. 
Appellant also cites Paraclete Manor of Kansas City v. 
State Tax Commission, 447 S.W.2d 311 (Mo. 1969), as authority for 
its argument on this point. However, Paraclete's requirement that 
the charitable use not be wholly supported by government funds was 
expressly overruled by Franciscan, suera, 566 S.W.2d at 224-6. 
The remaining out-of-state cases cited by respondent are 
wholly irrelevant to this issue since they involve questions of the 
charitable use of the property, not the source of funds. In Dow 
City Senior Citizens Housing Inc. v. Board of Review of Crawford 
County, 230 N.W.2d 497 (Iowa 1975), the court hela that there was no 
charitable use of the property because the rent charged to the 
tenants was at the market rate and was not adjusted by need. Id. at 
499. The court did mention the fact that the project received 
government assistance, but this was not a factor in its decision; it 
merely held that since the property was not being used for 
charitable purposes, the taxpayers should not be required to provide 
an "exemption subsidy" in addition to the direct government payments 
made to the project. Id. A similar rationale was the basis for 
County of Douglas v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc., 111 N.W.2d 719 
(Nebraska 1961), where the court held that "the furnishing of 
low-cost housing at its real cost" is not a charitable use. Id. at 
725. Since Respondent does not require its tenants to pay a rent 
equivalent to either the market rate or the cost of the project, but 
rather adjusts the rent to reflect each tenant's ability to pay, 
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neither Dow City nor Douglas prevents a char1taole exempt1un here. 
Finally, Hilltop Village v. l\erville IndetJende11t School District, 
487 S.W.2d 167 (Texas Civ. Ap!J. 1972), which held that a nursing 
home that adjusted its rental charges to reflect each tenant's 
ability to pay was not using the property for charitable purposes, 
id. at 169, is directly contrary to the holding of this court in 
Friendship Manor, whose exemption criteria are satisfied here, for 
reasons previously discussed. 
B. Respondent Has Contributed to St. Mark's Tower. 
Assuming arguendo that a contribution by Hespondent to St. 
Mark's Tower would be necessary to sustain a charitable exemption 
under Utah law, such an exemption would be available, since 
Respondent has made substantial contributions of both money and 
services to the complex. These contributions, as described in the 
record, have been almost totally ignored by Appellant in his summary 
of the facts. The money needed to build the complex was not donateo 
to Respondent by the Department of Housing and Urban Development; it 
was lent to Respondent by HUD under an agreement which makes 
Respondent liable if it does not repay all amounts due. 
The record below also indicates that for the proJect to 
become a reality, approximately 1250 manhours were spent by 
volunteers on behalf of Respondent and its parent, the Episcopal 
Diocese of Utah, in the negotiation of the loan agreement with HUD, 
the selection of the building site, the construction of tne complex, 
and the selection of the managing agent; none of the volunteers were 
compensated for any of this time. In addition, the Episcopal 
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Diocese incurred approximately $1500 in travel expenses for these 
endeavors, none of which was reimbursed by Respondent. 
Besides its sizable contributions in establishing St. 
Mark's Tower, Respondent makes substantial contributions to insure 
the proJect's continued operation. Respondent's Board of Directors 
meets monthly to make the policy decisions necessary for the 
proJects continued successful operation. Again, these individuals 
volunteer their services. 
Thus, the record in this case demonstrates that Respondent 
is not acting as a mere passive conduit for funds given it by the 
federal government, as Appellant would have this Court believe. In 
fact, Respondent has incurred substantial monetary obligations, and 
has generously donated its services to bring about the creation and 
continued operation of St. Mark's Tower, a commitment consisting of 
"the generous giving of one's talents and goods to those in need 
thereof" that is the essence of charity. United Presbyterian, 448 
P.2d at 975. While Respondent does not wish to denigrate the 
contributions made by others, it respectfully submits that St. 
Mark's Tower would not be in existence today without the 
contributions made by Respondent. 
VI. RESPONDENT'S ACTIVITIES BENEFIT THE COMMUNITY. 
Under Utah law, for an activity to be "charitable," it must 
provide a benefit to the community by serving a social need. 
Charity has been defined as "activities • rendered for the 
general improvement and betterment of mankind [which] benefit 
the community as a whole or an unascertainable and indefinite 
portion thereof." B. P.O. E. No. 85 v. Tax Commission, 536 P. 1214, 
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1216 (Utah 1975), quoted with approval in bSb P. <u 
at 1194. 
Appellant, citing Salt Lake Lodye No. bS B.P.u.E. v. 
Groesbeck, 120 P. 192, 194 (Utah 1911), argues that the only cyfle vt 
benefit to the community which may support an exemption is one which 
reduces governmental expenditures. Yet a careful reaaing of 
Groesbeck reveals that this Court required such a quid pro quo not 
for a use to be "charitable," but only for a loose construction ot 
the exemption on the issue of whether the property was being used 
exclusively for charitable purposes, i.e. whether an exemption could 
survive if the property was used for both charitable and 
non-charitable purposes. Id. at 193-4. Since there has been no 
"mixed use" issue raised in this case -- the only use issue oeing 
whether the sole use of tne property is charitable the Groesoec' 
test is not relevant here. In addition, it should be noted that 
Groesbeck was overruled by Loyal Order of Moose No. 259 v. County 
Board of Equalization, 657 P.2d 257 (Utah 1982), beginning January 
1, 1983. 
A broader meaning of charity, one which recognizes that a 
reduction in governmental expenditures is but one form of a benefit 
to the community, was given in B.P.O.E. No. 85 v. Tax Commission: 
A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully 
defined as a gift, to be applied consistently with the existing 
laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either 
by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of 
education or religion, by relieving their bodies from aisease, 
suffering or constraint, by assisting them to establish 
themselves in life, or by erecting or maintaining public 
buildings or works or otherwise lessening the burdens of 
government. 
536 P.2d at 1216-17. 
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The record in this case shows clear and uncontradicted 
of the benefits to the community generated by St. Mark's 
Tower: 
1. The complex saves the state more than the 
estimated $40,000 annually which would be gained in property tax 
revenues because many of the residents would otherwise go into 
nursing homes, where they would be cared for at state expense 
through the Medicaid program.* 
2. Those tenants not eligible for Medicaid provided 
nursing home care would be forced to live alone in single room 
occupancy "flophouses", where the often unsafe and unsanitary 
living conditions have a profoundly deleterious effect on the 
physical and psychological health of their elderly residents. 
St. Mark's Tower benefits these people by providing them with 
activities, fellowship and safe, sanitary living conditions. 
This environment is especially conducive to the physical and 
mental well-being of the residents. A similar project was held 
to provide a benefit to the community in Franciscan, where the 
court noted that the activities "and the continued companionship 
available for such projects does help prolong life and health by 
reaffirming the sense that life is worth living, that society 
cares." 566 S.W.2d at 225. 
* A simple mathematical illustration confirms this. Thus 
the total estimated average annual income of the 102 tenants is 
$469,000 (102 x $4600). The cost of nursing home care is estimated 
at $1,000 per month (Tr. 35), or $1,224,000 for the 102 tenants. As 
$469,000 would totally exhaust the combined income of these elderly 
persons the difference of $755,000 would have to be paid from some 
other segment of society. 
-23-
3. The type of care proviued bi ::it. t'larK's Tower is 
viewed as the most cost eftecti·;e, i.e. the method tnat reaucec 
the cost to society as a whole of caring for elaerly ana 
handicapped people. Were the residents placed in nursing homes, 
others would be paid to provide them services -- such as bathiny 
and dressing them that they are able to perform oy 
themselves, at no cost to society, at St. Mark's Tower. If the 
residents were living in private apartments scattered throughout 
the county, extra costs would be incurred in delivering to them 
health care and other social services. By sparing society as a 
whole significant expenditures in caring for its residents, St. 
Mark's Tower is providing the type of benefit to che community 
that merits a property tax deduction under B.P.O.E. No. 85 and 
Salt Lake County v. Tax Commission. 
Appellant argues that any benefit leading to a reduction in 
state government expenditures -- specifically, Medicaid -- should be 
ignored in determining the benefit to the community, because the tax 
here was assessed not by the state, but by Salt Lake County. This 
position finds no support in Article XIII, § 2 of the State 
Constitution, which gives absolutely no indication that a piece ot 
property could be exempt from state taxation yet subJect to county 
taxation, or vice versa. There is also no indication that 
eligibility for an exemption could depend on the allocation ot 
social service responsibilities between the state ana its counties, 
Furthermore, this contention overlooks the fact that a county's 
taxing power is derived solely from the state legislature; if 
property is deemed to be used for charitable purposes because it 
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reduces state expenditures or otherwise benefits the community, the 
state is prohibited from taxing it unuer Article XIII, § 2, and the 
state cannot circumvent the prohibition by authorizing a county to 
tax the property; since the county derives its taxing power solely 
from the state under Article XIII, § 5 and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-4-3[5], any tax tnat the state cannot assess cannot be assessed 
oy a county. 
That the community benefits greatly from housing for the 
elderly and handicapped is recognized by many Federal and State 
statutes, which have expressed a strong public policy in favor of 
the type of housing provided by St. Mark's Tower. The Utah State 
Legislature, in the Public Welfare portion of the Utah Code, 
§ 55-18-1 (1974), stated: 
It is declared to be the policy of the state of Utah 
to promote the general welfare of its citizens that it is 
necessary to remedy the uns.afe and unsanitary housing conditions 
and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings 
for families of low income, in urban and rural areas. These 
conditions cause an increase and spread of disease and crime, 
and constitute a menace to the health, safety, morals and 
welfare of the state. It is the policy of the state of Utah to 
make adequate provision of housing for persons of low income, 
for elderly persons of low income, for handicapped persons of 
low income, for vetrans of low income unable to provide 
themselves with decent housing on the basis of benefits 
available to them through certain government guarantees of loans 
available to them through certain government guarantees of loans 
for purchase of residential property, and during lmited periods, 
housing for disaster victims. The provision of safe and 
sanitary dwelling accommodations at rents or prices which 
persons of low income can afford will materially assist in 
developing more desirable neighborhoods and alleviating the 
effects of poverty in this state. The purposes of this act are 
t meet these problems by providing low-cost housing for 
low-income persons and to encourage cooperation between 
political subdivisions thereby making available low-cost housing 
facilities in all areas of the state. It is in the public 
interest to utilize the board financial resources and technical 
services available to government in cooperation with the 
ingenuity and expertise of private enterprise to alleviate this 
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lack of safe and sanitary dwellinc;s wl111._ ·' ;,i,11L1tir1•J lucdl 
industry. 
It should be noted thc:it SLl\_·11 ut pq11,__·1 nuL unl: 
applies to actions by government, but that tt1 is snal l be uone "in 
cooperation with the ingenuity and expertise of private enterprise." 
Congress articulated a similar purpose when it passeo the 
National Housing Act: 
The Congress finds that there is a large ana growiny 
need for suitable housing for older people both in urban and 
rural areas. Our older citizens face special problems in 
meeting their housing needs because of the prevalence of mooest 
and limited incomes among the elderly, their difficult; in 
obtaining liberal long-term home mortgage credit, and their neec 
for housing planned ano designed to incluoe features necessary 
to the safety and convenience of the occupants in a suitable 
neighborhood environment. The Congress further finos that tne 
present programs for housing the elderly unoer the Department ot 
Housing and Urban Development have proven the value of Feaeral 
credit assistance in this field and at the same time 
demonstrated the urgent need for an expanded ano more 
comprehensive effort to meet our responsibilities to our senior 
citizens. 
12 U.S.C.A. § 170lr (1980). 
Congress reaffirmed these purposes in the Low-Income 
Housing Act: 
It is the policy of the United States to promote tne 
general welfare of the Nation by employing its funds and creait, 
as provided in this chapter, to assist tne several btates ana 
their political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe and unsanitary 
housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, ano 
sanitary dwellings for families of lower income and, 
inconsistent with the obJectives of this chapter, to vest in 
local public housing agencies the maximum amount of 
responsibility in the aaministration of tneir housing 
programs. 
42 u.s.c.A 1437 (Supp. 1982). 
A report to the Special Committee on Aging of tl1e Unitecc: 
States Senate in 1978 stated: 
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Out-of-reach housing expenses are not tne only 
problem. There is also widespread and growing unavailability of 
shelters suiteu to varying housing needs of entire groups of 
elderly persons. For example, a recent report issued by tnis 
committee described the needs of frail and impaired olaer 
persons ana estimated that upwards of 200,00U, such indiviauals 
would annually choose to resiae in congregate housing if it were 
available, offering meal service, housekeeping aid, personal 
assistance, and other services necessary to maintain 
independence and dignity. 
The need for such service-supplemented shelter will 
continue to increase;new estimates just obtained by the 
committee indicate that, between now and the year 2000, the 
"graying" of the population will accelerate; the percentage of 
older persons more than 75 years of age will increase from 3& 
percent to 45 percent of the total post-65 population. Without 
new housing resources, such persons will probably be forced into 
costly and premature institutionalization in nursing homes, 
hospitals, and other medical facilities. Legislation now in 
preparation would expand the availability of congregate services 
within federally assisted housing programs. 
This information paper describes another group of 
older Americans. They have been described as "the invisible 
elderly" and they reside alone in single-room occupancy (SRO) 
hotels which are generally located in decaying and crime-ridden 
sections of urban America. 
Single Room Occupancv; A Need For National Concern, June, 1978, 
G.P.0. Stock No. 042-070-04542-6, p. iii. 
These quotations reflect governmental recognition of our 
society's desperate need for housing for our low-income elderly. 
They also show that the lack of such housing puts strains upon other 
community resources. It is difficult to believe that steps taken to 
help remedy this need and reauce the strain on other 
resources would not be classified as "charitable." 
CONCLUSION 
The property known as St. Mark's Tower is being used 
exclusively for charitable purposes under Article XIII, § 2 of the 
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Constitution of the State of Utah. The dec1s1un of D1str1ct 
Court should therefore be 
C\,,), 
DATED this cL day ot June, 1903. 
FABIAN & 
A Professional Corporation 
ton 
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